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Chapter 7 
Gendered risks of retirement 
The legal governance of defined 
contribution pensions in Canada 
Mary Condon* 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines how the governance of new employer-sponsored pen-
sion arrangements in Canada mediates the relationship between gender and 
discourses of economic risk. It considers the role played by these pension 
regimes in maintaining gendered forms of financial self-governance and eco-
nomic insecurity. It asks whether evolving precepts of pension regulation 
assist or hinder women who wish to resist the disciplinary reach of policy 
restructurings in the employer-based pension sector. 
The argument will be made in this chapter that legal governance of defined 
contribution (DC) pensions is an example of a shift away from ‘command 
and control’ forms of regulation, and that one of its effects is to redistribute 
economic risks away from employer pension sponsors and towards 
employees, particularly lower-paid women. The central objective is to exam-
ine, from a feminist point of view, several specifically legal devices for the 
management of employee financial risk in a DC context. A core feature of a 
DC pension is that it typically allows workers to make decisions about where 
pension contributions should be invested. At one level, the ability to make 
choices, and a governance regime facilitating this, is broadly consistent with 
feminist emancipatory goals. Choice making in this context replaces older-
established, more paternalistic notions of fiduciary duties1 owed to workers 
by employers or pension trustees. Indeed fiduciary duties employed as legal 
responsibility devices in various contexts have been critiqued from a feminist 
perspective (Gabaldon 1995; Nedelsky 1989). However, I argue that the 
detail of how this shift to facilitating choice making might play out in 
the pension context needs to be interrogated closely, particularly with regard 
to the push to embrace risk in order to self-provide financial sustainability. 
* Osgoode Hall Law School. The author acknowledges the research support of SSHRC as well 
as the hospitality of the Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto. 
1 A  fiduciary duty is usually taken to mean the requirement to act with loyalty, good faith and in 
the best interests of the person. or group to whom the duty is owed 
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In particular, feminist legal analysis of evolving pension governance may 
need to take more seriously research findings from disciplines such as 
social psychology and feminist economics, to the effect that structures of 
rationality and decision making may themselves be gendered, particularly 
with respect to the advantages and disadvantages of risk taking (Finucane 
et al 2000; Strauss 2006b). The argument is that perceptions of degrees 
of risk are correlated with the levels of vulnerability and control experienced 
by those assessing the risk (Finucane et al 2000). As Slovic (1999: 693) 
expresses it: 
. . . race and gender differences in perceptions and attitudes point toward 
the role of power, status, alienation, trust, perceived government 
responsiveness, and other sociopolitical factors in determining percep-
tion and acceptance of risk. To the extent that these sociopolitical factors 
shape public perception of risks, we can see why traditional attempts to 
make people see the world as White males do, by showing them statistics 
and risk assessments, are often unsuccessful . . .  
The claims made in this chapter will be addressed by first placing the evolving 
legal regime for DC pensions in Canada in larger political economy perspec-
tive. Here the argument is that this macro perspective betrays gendered 
underpinnings. Then the chapter will focus in on the legal regime for DC 
pensions in Canada, in order to demonstrate how it is likely to reinforce 
gender disadvantage, and how it is based on a valorization of forms of 
choice making that is not sensitive to gendered rationalities about risk. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS 
It is widely accepted in the pension and labour studies literatures that there 
has been a shift in the employer-based retirement income sector away from 
‘defined benefit’ (DB) forms of pension provision and towards DC plans.2 
2 This shift has been occurring at varying paces in different countries. In the US, ‘more than 
four-fifths of all workers covered by employer-sponsored pension plans are participants in DC 
plans’ (US Department of Labor). In the UK, ‘over 60% of defined-benefit schemes have been 
closed or replaced by defined-contribution schemes’ (Ring 2003: 67). However, in Canada, ‘the 
vast majority of DC plans are with small or medium-sized employers, representing less than 
$10 million in assets each’ (Sharratt 2003: 31, 36). In 2004, the Joint Forum of Financial 
Market Regulators noted that over three million Canadians belong to Capital Accumulation 
Plans (CAPs), which have approximately $60 billion in assets, and over 80 per cent of which 
allow members to make investment choices (Joint Forum 2004 Backgrounder). Figures 
from the same year indicate that there are slightly more DC plans in Canada than there are 
DB plans (7,507 of the first type and 7,014 of the second), though more than 
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In the first type, employers remain liable for funding a calculable ‘pension 
promise’ to workers, while in the second, employers undertake only to make 
specific contributions, with the ultimate financial outcome for the worker 
being largely dictated by how well the employers’ and/or employees’ contri-
butions perform when invested in various financial products. In a DC pen-
sion, individual employees usually make the decisions about where to invest 
the contributions. In contrast, investment decision making in the traditional 
DB format is centralized in the hands of pension trustees who make decisions 
for the fund collectively. A vigorous debate exists in the political economy 
literature as to whether the genesis of this policy shift is in the ‘shareholder 
primacy’ thesis of corporate organization (i.e. that corporations are more 
interested in providing short-term returns to shareholders than benefits to 
employees), or alternatively in the moral economy of state-sponsored neo-
liberalism (which valorizes autonomous, individualized choice making and 
market-based service provision) (Cutler and Waine 2001). 
In earlier work I have argued that the political economy of the shift to DC 
pensions is gendered at many levels.3 Gendered features of this shift include 
foundational understandings of the relationship between periods of product-
ive work and ‘non-productive’ work (in retirement or for childcare) in indi-
viduals’ life cycles. The idea that provision for retirement is based on a model 
of continuous full-time employment for a 30- or 40-year period followed by a 
shorter period of retirement does not tend to capture the complicated nature 
of the relationship between ‘productive’ labour and caring work in women’s 
lives (Bezanson and Luxton 2006). Meanwhile, considering the situation of 
women in labour markets only, there remains ample data demonstrating that 
women remain more likely to have lower incomes and to engage in non-
standard employment4 than men, with adverse consequences for avoiding 
poverty in old age (Vosko 2000). Such economic disadvantage in employment 
situations has a knock-on effect for financial well-being in retirement, once it 
is assumed that labour market involvement is meant to provide the bulk of 
that financial provision. This empirical data about the gendered nature of the 
labour market remains relevant despite the need now to be cognisant of the 
fact that a new gender order has been evolving over the last several decades 
(Cossman and Fudge 2002). This new gender order requires that the category 
of gender be disaggregated, according to the extent to which women interact 
with the labour market.5 The conclusion to be drawn from this material is 
80 per cent of all pension plan members remain in DB plans (Kaplan 2006: 3). The preponder-
ance of employees still covered by DB plans are in the public sector, with less than 25 per cent 
of private sector workers in Canada being members of DB plans (SEI Canada 2006: 2). 
3 Condon (2006). 
4 That is, not full-time, full-year. 
5 In other words, those women who are streaming into professionalized, full-time, high-paying 
jobs are not necessarily economically disadvantaged compared to men. 
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that turning to pension structures that reduce responsibilities on employers 
and heighten the need for workers to interact directly with investment mar-
kets has the capacity to create ‘new forms of gender inequality, new forms of 
discursive discipline, and new forms of gendered insecurity’ (Condon 2006). 
THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PENSION PROVISION 
Pension policy restructuring in the employer sector is itself embedded in a 
broader institutional and policy context concerning how to provide adequate 
levels of retirement income for all citizens. In earlier work I and others have 
canvassed how the discourses undergirding entitlements to retirement income 
have changed from being centred around norms of collective citizenship 
rights to being premised on neoliberal individualized responsibility (Miller 
and Rose 1990; Condon 2002). Specifically, I have argued that in the current 
era of neoliberalism, the role of the state with respect to retirement income 
has shifted away from a focus on the direct provision of economic benefits 
and towards developing the institutionalized and regulatory structures within 
which privatized retirement takes place. In that sense, the role of the state has 
become increasingly focused on strategies of risk management, often by way 
of reshaping regulatory norms (O’Malley 1998; Moss 2002; Braithwaite 
2000). More specifically, Strauss has recently argued that various welfare 
states may be plotted along a continuum, according to the extent to which 
they seek to ameliorate what she calls ‘gender inequality risk’ (Strauss 2006a). 
Examples of welfare state policies that address gender equality risks include 
‘sex discrimination and equal pay legislation, individual and household sys-
tems of taxation, affirmative action programmes . . . and the treatment of 
unpaid caring work by pension regimes’ (Strauss 2006a: 11). It is notable that 
many of these risk management strategies do not involve the direct payment 
of benefits. Specifically in relation to pensions, Strauss argues that there are 
‘four interrelated risk dimensions associated with gender’. These are ‘the 
public/private mix and commitment to redistribution, basis of entitlement, 
treatment of unpaid work and caring, and access to income’ (ibid: 13). While 
the preoccupation of this chapter is more directly with the role of the ‘private’ 
employment sector rather than the state in ameliorating pension risk based 
on gender, it is clear that issues of the basis of pension entitlement and the 
mix of public and private provision of retirement income are central to the 
analysis of the legal governance of gender-based pension risk in Canadian 
labour markets. 
Yet, it is true that Canada’s uptake of Keynesianism after the Second 
World War was still organized around the idea that direct public provision of 
individual benefits would be supplemented significantly by retirement bene-
fits payable by employers (Deaton 1989). In this sense, Canada is more closely 
aligned with the UK than any other European country plotted on Strauss’s 
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continuum of national pension regimes (Strauss 2006a). There is a universal 
state-provided retirement benefit (Old Age Security) as well as a further 
retirement amount payable to all who participated in the paid labour force on 
the basis of contributions made by employers and workers (Canada Pension 
Plan). However, these two benefits taken together are expected to provide only 
35 per cent of pre-retirement income for those earning the Canadian average 
wage or less. Any retirement income beyond this must come from a third tier 
of benefits payable by individual employers or personal investment resources. 
Importantly, this third tier has always been assumed to be voluntary on the 
part of employers. Thus, individual employers will provide employer-specific 
pension benefits (either DB or DC) only if they consider it beneficial to 
retaining or attracting a qualified labour force. Nonetheless, the state has 
attempted to provide incentives to employers to provide these benefits, by 
according favourable taxation status to money accumulated in so-called 
registered pension plans (RPPs). 
HOW IS LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PLANS ACCOMPLISHED? 
As noted above, the underlying premise from which the regulation of 
employer-sponsored pension plans springs is one whereby there is no legal 
requirement on employers to provide them at all. If the financial or legal 
obligations attendant on maintaining a plan become too onerous, employers 
may terminate them, though detailed procedures must be followed to do 
so (Kaplan 2006: Chapter 9). It is no surprise then that the legal discourse 
surrounding the development of a regulatory framework for DC plans in 
Canada emphasises so-called ‘decentred’ or voluntary forms of governance 
such as codes of conduct, best practices, contractual arrangements and the 
like.6 This is most obvious in the recent Guidelines for Capital Accumulation 
Plans (CAPs), promulgated in Canada by the Joint Forum of Financial 
Market Regulators (Joint Forum) in May 2004. These guidelines open with 
6 The same philosophy underlies the recommendations of the 2001 Myners report in the UK, 
(Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review) advocating codes of practice and robust 
disclosure requirements (see Chap 11). An important feature of the evolving regulatory land-
scape is the way in which the growth of DC pensions provide a case study of global political 
economic influences on law. Thus, ‘[G]lobally the DC pension plan industry is moving towards 
more common regulatory standards and practices . . . global harmonization of DC govern-
ance practices assists multinational companies in introducing a common global DC risk 
management approach, which is appropriate in each local jurisdiction’ (Felix 2005: 11). But 
differences which persist in governance requirements as between different countries, such as 
Australia and the UK, illustrate the continuing importance of local variation here (DC Forum 
December 2005 at 10 and 11). 
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the sentiment that they are ‘intended to support the continuous improvement 
and development of industry practices (s.1)’. Indeed, one of the stated revi-
sions to the final version of the CAP guidelines was that ‘any language sug-
gesting mandatory requirements has been eliminated to reduce confusion 
regarding the voluntary nature of the Guidelines’.7 
In terms of the background to these guidelines, the Joint Forum worked 
between April 2001 and May 2004 to develop a final version. While it invited 
written comments and held focus group sessions across the country, it is 
notable that almost no workers provided input into the content of the guide-
lines.8 The difficulties for individuals in penetrating regulatory discourses 
monopolised by repeat players and ‘experts’ has been well documented in the 
literature, and is a particular difficulty for advocacy groups supporting mar-
ginalized interests. As Condon and Philipps argue with respect to various 
arenas of economic governance, ‘a particular challenge is to increase the 
participation of women in market governance and to problematize the use of 
gender-blind analytic frameworks by economic policymakers’ (Condon and 
Philipps 2005: 128). 
The focus of the remaining sections of this chapter, then, is to unpack 
further the legal and conceptual underpinnings of the Guidelines for Capital 
Accumulation Plans (CAP guidelines), as the primary source of regulatory 
structure for the operation of DC plans in Canada. In undertaking this exam-
ination, we should be alert to whether this legal regime – designed to facilitate 
choice making – is sensitive to the possibility of gendered consciousness with 
respect to risk. 
HOW DO THE GUIDELINES WORK? 
The players and their risks 
The primary goal of these guidelines is to create a division of labour among the 
roles and responsibilities of the plan sponsor (the employer), the service 
7 Joint Forum of Financial Market Regulators, Summary of Stakeholder Comments and Regu-
lators Responses From Consultations on Proposed Guidelines for Capital Accumulation 
Plans, May 28 2004, at 2. 
8 Twenty-six written responses were received to the Joint Forum’s request for comments, all 
except one from organizations. While two comments were received from an organization called 
Canada’s Association for the Fifty-Plus (CARP) and a third from a similar organization based 
in Quebec, the rest came from institutions and organizations such as insurance companies, 
investment funds, consulting firms and industry lobby groups. The Joint Forum held 12 focus 
group sessions across the country, which were attended by plan sponsors, service providers and 
pension plan members. It also met with ‘representatives of industry associations throughout 
the consultation period’ (Backgrounder: 2). 
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provider (typically, an insurance company) and the members (the employees). 
Service providers are defined as ‘any provider of services or advice required 
by the CAP sponsor in the design, establishment and operation of a CAP 
(s.1.1.3)’. Although sponsors may delegate their responsibilities to service 
providers, they are initially responsible for setting up and maintaining the 
pension plan, and ‘providing investment information and decision-making 
tools to CAP members (s.1.3.1)’. Meanwhile, the guidelines make clear that 
plan members are ‘responsible for making investment decisions within the 
plan and for using the information and decision-making tools made available 
to assist them in making those decisions’. Thus, in contrast to typical DB 
pension plans, where investment allocation decisions for the plan are made by 
fund trustees or delegated by them to investment managers, the regulatory 
scheme for DC plans responsibilizes individual workers to engage in the 
investment enterprise. Pension fund trustees, with their attendant legal fidu-
ciary responsibilities to beneficiaries, are thereby removed from the equation 
in a DC context (Davis 2004). 
The guidelines further indicate that CAP members should ‘also consider 
obtaining investment advice from an appropriately qualified individual in 
addition to using any information or tools the CAP sponsor may provide’. 
Not only is the obtaining of investment advice also downloaded to individual 
employees, but the guidelines contain an explicit acceptance of the idea that 
the information to be provided by the sponsor may be inadequate or subject 
to a conflict of interest (s.1.3.3). In distributing to workers the risk of making 
inadequate or inappropriate contribution investment decisions, and thereby 
ending up with an inadequate pension, the guidelines take no account of 
variation in the willingness or ability of individual workers to assume these 
risks. No account is taken of the possibility that the willingness to assume 
risk is itself gendered or racialized. We have noted above Slovic’s contention 
that risk perceptions and attitudes reflect race and gender differences. This 
gender-variable acceptance of risk occurs in a context in which there is no 
enforcement mechanism provided by the guidelines themselves to assist with 
the actual carrying out of the various responsibilities assigned to the relevant 
parties. 
According to the guidelines, responsibility to employees in a DC context 
is satisfied if various disclosures are made to them. While this issue is dis-
cussed in more detail below, one stakeholder comment made in the process of 
discussing these guidelines before they were implemented was that ‘[T]he 
Guidelines underplay the aspect of risk. CAP sponsors should be required to 
sensitise members to risk factors’. The Joint Forum’s response to this submis-
sion was that this issue was already adequately addressed in the guidelines, 
pointing as an example to the disclosure to be provided to workers about the 
characteristics of specific investment funds and the risks associated with 
investing in them. This response is limited to issues of the risks associated 
with specific investments, as opposed to more global risks of this form of 
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pension provision or those that flow from interaction with financial markets 
more generally. Revealingly, a participant in a 2005 discussion among spon-
sors of CAPs across Canada noted that 
My focus is very much on the employee group. From a DC perspective, 
getting them to clearly recognize what their role is vs. what their employ-
er’s role is. I think too many of them still have the DB mindset that the 
organization is going to look after them. We have to make sure they 
know it might not be a happy ending. 
(Richards 2005: 22) 
These guidelines participate in and facilitate the assignment of a more intense 
form of pension risk to workers. At the same time, they rely on assumptions 
about the enthusiasm and competence with which employees will process 
information about the relative risks of various investment vehicles, to enable 
them to manage the possibility of increased financial insecurity. No distinc-
tions among workers in terms of how variables such as gender, race or class 
impact on dispositions towards risk are contemplated in the overall legal 
governance framework. 
Constructing the universe of choice making: 
employer selection of investment options 
The idea of making investment choices is built into the very definition of a 
CAP; we turn now to look in more detail at the parameters established by the 
guidelines for making those choices. The first significant issue is that they 
provide that it is the role of the sponsor to select the investment options to be 
made available in the plan. While the guidelines indicate that the sponsor 
should ‘ensure a range of investment options is made available’, it is clear that 
from the perspective of the worker, the much-vaunted autonomy being 
accorded to them is not unlimited, but constrained by prior choices made by 
the sponsor. The guidelines further provide that some considerations that 
should factor into the resulting menu of choices provided by the sponsor 
include the fees9 associated with the various options, as well as the liquidity,10 
degree of diversification, and level of risk associated with them, and the 
sponsor’s ability to review them. There is no encouragement provided to 
sponsors to assess the levels of investment risk that employees would be 
comfortable with assuming. The risk characteristics intrinsic to the invest-
ment options are given much more prominence than the risk characteristics of 
9 Such as transaction or management fees. 
10 The degree of liquidity of an investment refers to the ease with which it may be resold. An 
investment that will be hard to resell is described as illiquid. 
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the ultimate consumers of the options. Although reference is made to an 
additional factor to be considered, which is described as ‘the diversity and 
demographics of CAP members’, there is little attempt to explicitly acknow-
ledge the worker’s gender or race as a relevant factor in decisions about the 
menu of investment options to be made available (e.g. low risk versus high 
risk) that will have the effect of structuring individualized choice.11 
As noted in the introduction, the psychological and behavioural economic 
literature suggests that gender and race are significant constructs for choice 
making. In particular, feminist and behavioural economists have begun to 
point to the masculinity of rational utility-maximizing decision paradigms 
(Fineman 2005; Barber and Odean 2001). From the perspective of feminist 
economics, England distinguishes between the ‘separative’ and the ‘soluble’ 
self. She argues that the ‘separative self, for whom relations are fundamentally 
irrelevant, is the assumed homo economicus of the Market model’ (Nelson 
and England 2002). For ‘economic man’, rationality is equated with the 
maximization of wealth and the pursuit of self-interest. In contrast, ‘soluble’ 
selves – generally female or of a subordinate class or race – are those whose 
‘individual identity is effaced in the service of dependents and . . . allegedly 
autonomous actors’ (Nelson and England 2002). While feminist economists 
are interested in the way these stereotypes influence the methodologies and 
value systems of economics as a discipline, as opposed to a claim that this is 
an accurate description of how actual men and women behave, it suggests 
that economically acceptable forms of rationality (especially in an investment 
choice-making context) tend to be coded masculine rather than feminine. 
Finally, the menu of investment options available in a DC plan may be 
considerably circumscribed by the decision of the plan sponsor about involv-
ing a service provider. The guidelines make clear that in some cases, the 
choice of a service provider will ‘define or limit’ the type of investment 
options available to a plan. Again the discourse of choice is constrained by 
the prior decisions of employer-sponsors, which may be made on utilitarian, 
cost-effectiveness grounds, or because of a pre-existing relationship with the 
service provider. Workers may ultimately have some legal remedies to coun-
teract the disadvantage of being provided with inadequate investment 
choices. However, these will likely be mobilized only after financial losses have 
been sustained, and may do little to destabilize the prevailing ideology of the 
benefits of rational choice making in the mould of the masculinized ‘heroic 
financial risk-taker’ (de Goede 2004). 
11 An earlier version of the guidelines had contained a reference to sponsors taking into 
account ‘any preferences voluntarily indicated by members’ in designing overall investment 
options. The final version removed this reference to member preferences, substituting a 
request to sponsors that they consider member complaints in subsequent monitoring of the 
investment options provided (Stakeholder comments: 11). 
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What forms of regulatory support for 
choice making are provided? 
It is generally acknowledged among pensions academics and industry parti-
cipants that there is considerable resistance among large numbers of workers 
to the alleged opportunities being provided via DC plans to make pension-
related investment decisions (Mitchell and Utkus 2004; Blake 2003). The 
suggestion has also been made that the appetite for engaging in this form of 
decision making may vary culturally. David O’Brien, a vice president 
with McCain Foods Ltd in New Brunswick, who oversees 34 pension plans in 
56 countries, points out that ‘employees in many countries in which he has set 
up DC plans are simply not interested in a vast array of investment options’ 
(Davis 2005: 9). He elaborates; ‘This live free or die mentality in the U.S. isn’t 
replicated in a lot of countries around the world and employees don’t want 
choice . . . In Brazil, for example, we had an awful time trying to get 
employees to make decisions. They simply didn’t want to’ (ibid). As I 
have argued elsewhere, the repeated finding in the burgeoning ‘personal 
finance’ literature as well as academic research about the greater ‘risk aver-
sion’ of women as compared to men may obscure the possibility that the 
unwillingness to enter into the financialized risk discourses required of indi-
vidual workers is in fact an exercise of gendered agency rather than a sign of 
lack of agency. In other words, this systemic unwillingness should be taken 
seriously on its own terms as opposed to being considered a ‘problem’ to 
be overcome.12 It is against this background that we should return to the 
question of how the legal governance of CAP choice making is presently 
accomplished. 
Information disclosure 
The CAP guidelines place a heavy emphasis on disclosure of information as 
the predominant form of support to workers faced with investment choice 
making. As Kaplan points out, the focus of the CAP guidelines is ‘to ensure 
that employees in a defined contribution plan have adequate and informed 
access to investments. This is because the adequacy of that access can neces-
sarily affect the quality of the employee’s pension’ (2006: 107). The approach 
taken here is quite consistent with the demise of traditional command and 
control forms of regulation that might be more prescriptive in terms of the 
menu of choices to be offered to employees or that would require the provi-
sion of impartial advice. We have already noted the limitations of an 
approach to information disclosure that focuses on disclosing the risks of 
specific investments to workers, as opposed to a more global definition of 
12 Condon (2006). 
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pension risks as they relate to workers’ situations. Such a more holistic 
approach to disclosure might emphasize the vulnerability of pension results 
to the state of the financial markets, or the relative inefficiency of disaggregat-
ing pension funds into individual plans as opposed to large collective 
arrangements, or the emerging evidence that large groups of people, includ-
ing many women, exhibit systematic tendencies to make decisions (or to 
refuse to make them) that deviate from what the norms of rational utility-
maximizing would predict (Mitchell and Utkus 2004; Nofsinger 2005). 
In the evolving regulatory regime of DC pensions constructed by these 
guidelines, one of the primary responsibilities of sponsors to employees is 
that of providing them with investment information and decision-making 
tools. The guidelines indicate that the documentation provided should be 
prepared using ‘plain language and in a format that assists in readability and 
comprehension’. Section 3 elaborates that in deciding what types of informa-
tion and decision-making tools sponsors should provide – a decision for them 
to ultimately make – they should consider issues such as access to the internet 
and the ‘location, diversity and demographics of the members’. Again there 
might have been an opportunity here to consider whether information 
retrieval and processing might be gendered, but the guidelines do not specif-
ically advert to this. For example, do interactions and comfort levels with 
technological tools for obtaining information about investment options vary 
by gender? Do women employees systematically prefer specific types of 
information about investments (for example, the labour practices of a multi-
national firm)? Should women with fewer financial resources to invest in 
retirement vehicles (as a result of lower wages) choose different investment 
strategies than more affluent women or men? The issue of whether the infor-
mation people want to make investment decisions or the ways in which they 
use that information varies by gender is not raised. 
Instead the guidelines suggest that examples of appropriate investment 
information include glossaries explaining investment terms, information 
about investing in different types of securities (stocks and bonds), informa-
tion about the ‘relative level of expected risk and return associated with 
different investment options’ and performance reports for any investment 
funds offered in the CAP. Meanwhile, examples of decision-making tools 
include asset allocation models,13 retirement planning tools, projection tools 
to help members determine contribution levels and project future balances, 
and investor profile questionnaires. 
It is clear that the information considered relevant to members is consider-
ably technocratic, despite the fact that empirical evidence suggests that 
even professionalized pension trustees, to whom responsibility is delegated 
to make centralized investment decisions for much larger pools of money in 
13 Such as, for example, the allocation of contributions as between shares and bonds. 
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a DB context, do not always have the expertise required to make those 
investment decisions (Clark 2000). Again these forms of support for invest-
ment choice making seem of ambiguous value, when viewed through a femi-
nist lens. While some feminists may applaud the apparent move away from 
reliance on ‘expert knowledges’ inherent in the decline of centralized decision 
making by trustees, it is unclear just how preferable it is for women who are 
members of CAP plans to now be required to familiarize themselves with 
similar technocratic information in order to make individualized pension 
investment choices (Condon and Philipps 2005). 
Nor do the guidelines address the issue of whether employers need to take 
additional steps to encourage members to access these choice-making tools at 
all. In this sense, employees are required to be self-motivated to take advan-
tage of the information and assistance provided. Indeed, a frequently 
expressed concern among sponsors is that they not be perceived by their 
employees as providing them with pension advice. This is because the provi-
sion of advice might legally be considered to place the employer in a fiduciary 
relationship with the employee, opening up the possibility that the sponsor 
could be sued by plan members for inadequate advice giving. This fear is 
argued by some commentators to have a chilling effect on interactions 
between sponsors and employees, and is a major source of the alleged ‘legal 
risk’ faced by sponsors of DC plans (Kaplan 2006). It should be reiterated 
that the broader context here is that one of the central effects of a shift from 
DB forms of pension provision to DC forms is the removal of traditional 
fiduciary responsibilities formerly imposed on pension trustees, who have 
traditionally exercised centralized investment decision making on behalf of 
worker-beneficiaries as a group. 
In the U.S., the damaging effects on the pensions of Enron employees of 
over-investment in Enron securities in their 401(k) plans, following the cor-
poration’s bankruptcy has been documented (Blackburn 2002). In this con-
text, it is not surprising that the Canadian guidelines provide that additional 
information must be provided to members of a plan where securities of the 
employer itself or a related party are included as an investment option. This 
additional information includes ‘the risks associated with investing in a single 
security’. Again the influence of the Enron debacle may possibly be discerned 
in the regulation of the process of making transfers among investment 
options in section 4.3.14 This process requires that sponsors should provide 
members with information about ‘any restrictions on the number of transfers 
among options a member is permitted to make within a given period, 
14 As Blackburn describes it, part of the damage to Enron employees’ retirement portfolios 
occurred because they were prevented by a company-imposed transfer freeze from selling the 
Enron stock in their 401(k) plans, at the same time as Enron management were able to 
dispose of their stock options. See Blackburn (2002). 
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including any maximum limit after which a fee would be applied’. The 
sponsor should also provide ‘a description of possible situations where trans-
fer options may be suspended’. The possibility for sponsors to download 
expenses associated with operating the pension plan is signalled by the guide-
line that the sponsor should indicate ‘all fees, expenses and penalties relating 
to the plan that are borne by members’ including any costs that must be paid 
when investments are bought and sold. By s.5.3 of the guidelines, sponsors 
are required to provide performance reports for each investment fund to 
members at least annually. This requirement for ongoing performance 
reports, as well as periodic review by sponsors of the investment options 
offered (s.6.3), is taken by some commentators as an incentive to sponsors to 
provide ‘more limited’ investment options in the future (Austin 2004). This 
systematic effect of how the guidelines are framed runs counter to the express 
goal of introducing DC pensions, which is to expand the universe of pension 
choice making available to workers. 
Again, the question raised by the foregoing discussion is whether these 
disclosure norms adequately respond to the insights from various academic 
disciplines about actual decision-making practices. There is considerable 
empirical data emerging from the field of behavioural economics examining 
the ways in which individual decision making is ‘skewed’ by phenomena like 
framing, anticipatory regret, pride, endowment effects,15 mental accounting, 
decision paralysis and herd behaviour (Barber and Odean 2001; Nofsinger 
2005). For example, Mitchell and Utkus argue that there are framing effects 
that result from the very detail of how a menu of options is superficially 
presented to employees, even beyond the design of the underlying investment 
alternatives (Mitchell and Utkus 2004: 16). Mitchell and Utkus also report in 
detail on research dealing with the importance of plan design in driving 
participant decision making (ibid: 31). The findings of these types of investi-
gations by cognitive psychologists all bear on the question of the extent to 
which behaviour, such as investing behaviour, deviates from a rational profit-
maximizing model. 
Meanwhile, from an economic geography perspective, Strauss has argued 
that ‘the fact remains that people make decisions about their pensions in the 
context of a web of social relations, networks, institutions, and structures of 
power that for them constitute the “real world” of everyday life’ (Strauss 
2006b). Thus she argues that the model of ‘assisted rationality’ that grounds 
the provision of the type of technocratic information enumerated above 
will not be enough to produce useful choice making for many workers. 
More empirically, Greenwich Associates in the US report that ‘only a small 
15 This is the idea that people often ‘demand much more to sell an object than they would be 
willing to pay to buy it’ (Nofsinger 2005). Cognitive psychologists have run a number of 
experiments designed to find out why this is. One theory is that people are affected by the 
‘pain associated with giving up’ an object (ibid). 
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fraction of participants [in 401(k) plans] use the Internet advice tools avail-
able to them’ (March 2005). The limits of education as a response to the need 
to make DC choices are well articulated by Mitchell and Utkus (ibid: 32), 
who point to endemic problems of inertia and lack of ‘rationality’.16 We have 
noted above that the apparently applicable norms of rationality may them-
selves be gendered and racialized. Thus, for example, feminist critiques of 
corporate and securities law have argued that the elevation of norms of 
corporate profit maximizing over other plausible goals of business activity 
or organizational decision making (for example, social responsibility) is 
gendered (Sparkes 2002; Gabaldon 1992; Condon 2000). This empirical 
information casts doubt on the usefulness of regulating information dis-
closure as a risk management strategy for workers in a pension context. The 
question from a feminist perspective is whether there are might be more 
gender-aware forms of information disclosure that could be effective to 
mitigate the gender-based risk of economic insecurity in this area. A first 
step would be an openness to the possibility that the unwillingness to engage 
in risk-based decision making is not because of a lack of education about 
the positive features of risk, but rather a rejection of the premises of this 
discourse. 
Advice provision 
The CAP guidelines explicitly acknowledge the possibility that employees 
may need to access the ‘expertise’ of investment advisors in addition to utiliz-
ing the investment information provided by their employer. This decision is 
presented as one for the individual employee to make, in a context in which 
there is ‘no requirement that the plan sponsor test the investment knowledge 
of its members’ (Austin 2004). Indeed, one of the effects of the deployment of 
DC plans is to produce an ‘increasing involvement of third-party vendors of 
protection, investment and savings instruments’ (Shuey and O’Rand 2004: 
464; Miller and Rose 1990). 
The CAP guidelines exhort sponsors to periodically review service pro-
viders to whom they have referred members to help them make their invest-
ment decisions (s.6.2). Possible criteria to be used to frame such reviews 
include any complaints arising from members about the service provider or 
from the sponsor itself. However, the guidelines caution that ‘Because the 
primary relationship of a service provider who provides investment advice is 
with each member, it will not be possible or practical for the CAP sponsor to 
directly review the quality of the advice being provided’. This creates an 
accountability gap with respect to the practices of service providers in a 
16 See also Stabile (2002). 
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pension context, with employer sponsors assuming little oversight responsi-
bility for providers’ interactions with employees.17 
That the provision of advice by service providers may itself be gendered is 
suggested by the following excerpt from the financial planning literature. Yao 
and Hanna state (2005: 75): 
Although clients should ultimately decide whether they would like to 
take a certain level of financial risk, as a fiduciary of the client, a finan-
cial planner has the duty to act in the client’s best interest – to evaluate 
the client’s situation and make appropriate recommendations. It is the 
job of financial planners to educate clients (especially unmarried 
females) who choose inappropriate investments with low financial risk 
about their need to take more risk; and to educate male clients who 
have inappropriate investments with high risk about the importance of 
preserving wealth. 
The reference to the ‘education’ of clients about ‘appropriate’ risk levels 
based on gender and wealth suggests that advice givers do not take seriously 
the possibility that refusing to interact with risk discourses is a reasonable 
exercise of investment rationality. Significantly for the role of legal govern-
ance in the process of valorizing financial risk taking, the gender-based dis-
ciplining of investors outlined in the above quote is justified by invoking a 
fiduciary duty imposed on financial planners with respect to their clients. In a 
DC world the fiduciary duty of financial planners operating within the finan-
cial services industry is substituted for a similar duty that used to govern 
employers themselves in their pension dealings with workers. 
Sponsor monitoring 
An important aspect of the Canadian CAP guidelines is the exhortation to 
plan sponsors to engage in periodic review of their service providers, their 
investment options, their records maintenance and the decision-making tools 
provided to members. It is clear, however, that, for example, with respect to 
reviews of the adequacy of service providers, it is for the sponsor to decide 
what action to take in the event that a provider fails to meet the sponsor’s 
expectations. Thus, the accountability of service providers is downloaded to 
employers rather than being regulated centrally, in a context of an ongoing 
business relationship that is more consensual and contractually oriented than 
the traditional regulatory command and control model would be. We have 
seen already that this decentred monitoring of service providers is considered 
17 Kaplan takes a somewhat different view of the employers’ exposure to claims for negligent 
misrepresentation here. See Kaplan 2006: 368–370. 
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particularly important where the employer has engaged the service provider 
to provide investment advice to employees. Meanwhile, the guidelines suggest 
that reviews of investment options provided by the plan should be under-
taken at least annually, though again no further guidance is provided to 
sponsors as to whether or what action to take if particular investment options 
are no longer considered maintainable. This model creates incentives to 
streamline the investment choices being offered, since fewer choices mean less 
employer resources devoted to monitoring; nor is any direction provided as to 
the consequences of inadequate monitoring. 
Whither fiduciary duties? 
A noteworthy issue in the contemporary legal regulation of DC pensions in 
Canada is the ambiguity associated with the treatment of fiduciary responsi-
bilities towards employees. Traditionally, in a DB form of pension plan, it is 
clear that the trustees of a pension fund have a fiduciary responsibility to 
maximize the interests of the employee-beneficiaries.18 Where employees 
make investment decisions pertaining to their own pension account, the 
trustees’ fiduciary responsibility to make appropriate investment decisions on 
behalf of employees is removed. It may even be speculated that the removal 
of the legal liability risks associated with being a pension fund trustee is one 
of the subsidiary purposes of the shift from DB forms of pension provision 
to DC forms. Yet, as Kaplan notes in his contemporary treatment of Canadian 
pension law, it is possible that legal decision makers may find there to be 
residual fiduciary responsibilities expected of employer sponsors in a DC 
context. This concern on the part of Canadian employers is heightened by the 
contrast with the legal construction of DC plans in the US, where the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) specifically pro-
vides that no fiduciaries have any liability for any losses incurred in plans that 
permit participants to exercise control over the assets in their individual 
accounts. No such ‘safe harbour’ removing participant-directed pension 
plans from the fiduciary realm exists in Canadian pension law, nor is it 
adverted to in the CAP guidelines. 
Thus, Kaplan locates the sources of continuing legal risk for employers in 
the uncertainty surrounding fiduciary liability for both inadequate plan 
communication and inadequate investment choice. Similarly, Ahing argues 
that ‘DC plan sponsors may continue to face risks arising in at least 4 primary 
areas (1) insufficient plan information provided to members (2) incorrect plan 
18 Though the extent of that responsibility in the context of a DB plan, and in particular 
whether it may facilitate the making of fund investment decisions so as to achieve corporate 
social responsibility goals is currently the subject of intense academic and legal debate. See 
Davis (2004); Yaron (2001); Cowan v. Scargill [1985] 1 Ch D 270, [1984] 2 All ER 750. 
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information provided to members (3) improper choice of service provider in 
delegating responsibilities (4) insufficient monitoring of those service pro-
viders’.19 Even more specifically, does having a default investment option for 
employees who do not exercise their own choices create the possibility of 
liability for the sponsor who selected it? The argument would be that having a 
default option (e.g. a low risk, low return money market fund) presumes that 
the investor is not making her or his own choices, and opens up for legal 
scrutiny the adequacy of the option created by the sponsor (Benney 2004). 
The format this legal scrutiny would take is likely to flow from litigation 
engaged in by a group of employees as a class, alleging that the employer had 
breached a fiduciary duty to them. 
In this apparent atmosphere of uncertainty as to the application of 
residual fiduciary responsibility norms to employer sponsors, the question 
that might be raised from a feminist perspective is whether the legal device of 
creating a fiduciary relationship to mitigate worker pension risk is one to be 
supported or rejected for its gender-based consequences. Is fiduciary 
responsibility (either of employers in a DC context or trustees in a DB con-
text), as a legal device for the management of risk, to be preferred over more 
enlightened forms of information disclosure? The argument of this chapter 
has been that women and minorities are more likely to be economically dis-
advantaged by the ideology of individualized, technocratic choice making 
that underlies the shift to DC pensions. Yet some problems from a feminist 
perspective with the invocation of protective fiduciary norms should also be 
flagged. These include the dangers of paternalism, centralization of power, 
excessive reliance on expert knowledge, the privileging of some interests over 
others, as well as the possibility that fiduciaries’ conflicts of interest will in 
fact influence their decision making (Gabaldon 1995: 19–20; Davis 2004).20 
We have also noted above the way in which fiduciary duties may be invoked as 
a reason for ‘educating’ women to accept more risk in pension decision 
making. This issue of which legal risk management strategy is preferable 
for women is one that should be taken seriously by feminists engaging in 
gender-based advocacy in the retirement context. 
CONCLUSION 
At a material level, the gendered risks of pensions are ultimately deeply con-
nected to persistent inequalities in labour markets. The shift to DC pensions 
is gendered in that it removes economic security from vulnerable, lower-paid 
19 Ahing (2004). 
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workers, and lauds individualized and masculinized risk taking, while at the 
same time reducing the financial risk exposure of employers. Emerging legal 
norms – as exemplified by the CAP guidelines – that govern the allocation of 
material risks among employers, service providers and employees, can be seen 
to promote flexibility and choice for employers rather than workers. They are 
light on substantive regulatory requirements to be fulfilled by employers, and 
backstopped mainly by the possibility of workers launching suits for dam-
ages as a result of negligence or breach of fiduciary duty. 
At the discursive level, the prevailing legal conceptual universe tends to 
support the idea of the individual heroic risk taker, by attempting to situate 
risk taking in the context of partial and decontextualized information dis-
closure, rather than to offer alternatives to those employees, especially 
women, who do not wish to participate in the discourse of risk taking (Peggs 
2000; Strauss 2006b). But not participating in decision making means that 
the locus of decision making shifts elsewhere, either back to trustees, or to 
employers. Presented with the option of the capacity to choose or paternal-
istic choice making on her behalf by others, many feminists would be likely to 
support choice over paternalism. The question being raised in this chapter 
is whether this approach is still the right answer in the contemporary world 
of pension provision. Thus, alternative approaches for feminist advocacy 
could include either agitating for more effective gender-aware support for 
choice making and expanding the categories of ‘rational’ decision making, 
cautiously reopening the debate about the merits of creating fiduciary rela-
tionships among employers or trustees and employees, or, more radically, 
problematizing the foundational and deeply gendered link between labour 
market participation and adequate retirement security. 
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